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Abstract. Visual object tracking is an important task that requires the
tracker to find the objects quickly and accurately. The existing state-of-
the-art object trackers, i.e., Siamese based trackers, use DNNs to attain
high accuracy. However, the robustness of visual tracking models is sel-
dom explored. In this paper, we analyze the weakness of object trackers
based on the Siamese network and then extend adversarial examples to
visual object tracking. We present an end-to-end network FAN (Fast At-
tack Network) that uses a novel drift loss combined with the embedded
feature loss to attack the Siamese network based trackers. Under a sin-
gle GPU, FAN is efficient in the training speed and has a strong attack
performance. The FAN can generate an adversarial example at 10ms,
achieve effective targeted attack (at least 40% drop rate on OTB) and
untargeted attack (at least 70% drop rate on OTB).
Keywords: Adversarial Attack, Visual Object Tracking, Deep Learning
1 Introduction
Some studies have shown that DNN-based models are very sensitive to adver-
sarial examples [11]. In general, most recent methods for generating adversarial
examples rely on the network structure and their parameters, and they utilize
the gradient to generate adversarial examples by iterative optimization [28] [3].
Adversarial examples have successfully attacked deep learning tasks such as im-
age classification [23], object detection [29], and semantic segmentation [10]. Re-
searching adversarial examples can not only help people understand the princi-
ples of DNNs [30] but also improve the robustness of networks in visual tasks [14].
Visual Object Tracking (VOT) [18] aims to predict the object’s locations in
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a) Targeted Attack b) Untargeted Attack
Fig. 1. Two examples of adversarial attacks for VOT. To better show the attack-
ing results, we plot the bounding boxes in the initial frame. The numbers represent
the results in the corresponding video frames. The blue box represents the predicted
bounding box, and the yellow box represents the ground truth.
the subsequent frames in a video when given an objects location in the initial
frame. In recent years, deep learning [4] based trackers have achieved excellent
performance in many benchmarks. Among them, the SiamFC tracker [1] ex-
plores the similarity between video frames by using powerful deep features and
has achieved great results in accuracy and robustness for the tracking task. Sim-
ilar to the Faster R-CNN architecture [25] in object detection, the latest visual
object tracking methods are based on the Siamese network, and many variants
have been derived, such as SiamVGG [34], SiamRPN [20], SiamRPN++ [19]
and so on. Therefore, the significance of investigating the robustness of trackers
based on deep learning becomes quite crucial.
In different visual tasks, the attacking targets are different. In image clas-
sification task, the target is the classification problem. In the object detection
task, the target is the regression (for SSD and YOLO) or classification problem
(for Faster-RCNN). In object tracking, VOT searches the most similar regions
in each frame with the reference patch. Therefore the target is essentially the
similarity metric problem. Thus, attacking the tracking task is totally different
from the other image recognition tasks, and the existing attacking methods can-
not work well (the results in Section 4.4 verify this point).
Regarding the above motivation, in this paper, we study the adversarial at-
tacks on Visual Object Tracking (VOT). Firstly, because the adversarial attack
on VOT is seldom explored, we give a definition of the targeted attack and untar-
geted attack in the visual object tracking task. Then, we propose an end-to-end
fast attack network (FAN) that combines the drift loss and embedded feature
loss to jointly perform the targeted and untargeted attacks on VOT. Under the
hardware condition of a single GPU, we only need 3 hours off-line training on the
ILSVRC15 dataset. In the inference phase, the generator can generate adversar-
ial perturbations in milliseconds speed for the OTB dataset [32] and the VOT
dataset [16]. Figure 1 gives two examples. Targeted attack causes the tracker to
track object along any specified trajectory. Untargeted attack makes the tracker
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unable to keep track of the object. Overall, our contributions can be summa-
rized as follows: (1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first one to perform
the targeted attack and untargeted attack against the Visual Object Tracking
(VOT) task. We analyze the weakness of the trackers based on the Siamese net-
work, and then give a definition of the targeted attack and untargeted attack
in this task. (2) We propose a unified and end-to-end attacking method: FAN
(fast attack network). We design a novel drift loss to achieve the untargeted at-
tack effectively and apply the embedded feature loss to accomplish the targeted
attack. Finally, we combine these two loss functions to jointly attack the VOT
task. (3) After three hours of training, FAN can successfully attack VOT and
OTB datasets without fine-tuning network parameters. In inference, FAN can
quickly produce adversarial examples within 10ms, which is much faster than
iterative optimization algorithms.
2 Related Work
2.1 Deep Learning in Object Tracking
Modern tracking systems based on the deep network can be divided into two cat-
egories. The first branch is based on a tracking-by-detection framework [27]. The
second branch is mainly based on SiamFC [1] and SiamRPN [20]. For SiamFC,
these methods focus on discriminative feature learning [35] [12] [34], exemplar-
candidate pairs modeling [6], and dynamical hyperparameter optimization [8] [7].
For SiamRPN, some researchers introduce a more powerful network cascaded
model [9] or deeper architecture [19] for region proposal searching. DaSiam [37]
proposes a distractor-aware training strategy to generate semantic pairs and sup-
press semantic distractor. In summary, the Siamese trackers show their superior
performance due to the high localization accuracy and efficiency, but most of
these trackers are sensitive to the adversarial pertubations of the input data.
Therefore, investigating the robustness of these trackers under adversarial at-
tracks becomes crucial.
2.2 Iterative and Generative Adversary
The existing adversarial attacks are based primarily on the optimization algo-
rithm and generation algorithm. The optimization-based adversarial attack dis-
covers the noise’s direction by calculating the DNNs’ gradient within a certain
limit [3]. I-FGSM [17] decomposes one-step optimization into multiple small
steps, and iteratively generates adversarial examples for image classification.
DAG [33] regards the candidate proposal for RPN [25] as a sample, and itera-
tively change the proposal’s label to attack object detection and segmentation.
Another type of adversarial attack is based on the generator, which can quickly
generate adversarial perturbations [2]. GAP [24] uses the ResNet generator ar-
chitecture to misclassify images of ImageNet [5]. UEA [29] generates transfer-
able adversarial examples by combining multi-layer feature loss and classification
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loss, aiming to achieve an untargeted attack in image and video detection. Due
to speed limitations, adversarial attacks based on iterative optimization cannot
achieve real-time attacks in the visual object tracking task.
3 Generating Adversarial Examples
3.1 Problem Definition
Let V = {I1, ..., Ii, ..., In} be a video that contains n video frames. For simplic-
ity, we take one tracking object as the example, thus Bgt = {b1, ..., bi, ..., bn} is
used to represent the object’s ground-truth position in each frame. The visual
object tracking will predict the position Bpred of this object in the subsequent
frames when given its initial state. For different datasets, the predicted output
is different. In general, four points bi ∈ R4 are used to represent the box.
In SiamFC [1], the tracker fθ(·) with parameters θ first transforms the ref-
erence frame IR and annotation b
init to get an exemplar region z = τ(IR, b
init),
and searches a large area bsearch in the candidate frame IC to get a candidate
region x = τ(IC , b
search). After feature extraction ϕ(·), a fully-convolutional net-
work is used to calculate the similarity between z and x to get the response score
map S = fθ(z, x) = ϕ(z) ∗ ϕ(x). A Cosine Window Penalty (CWP) [1] is then
added to generate the final bounding box bi = CWP (S). CWP can penalize the
large offset, making the predicted box not far from the previous box.
Vˆ = {Iˆ1, ..., Iˆi, ..., Iˆn} represents the adversarial video. The generator mainly
attacks the candidate area xˆi = τ(Iˆi, b
search
i ) in the adversarial frame Iˆi. The
definitions of targeted and untargeted attacks in VOT are given below:
(1) Targeted Attack. The adversarial video Vˆ guides the tracker to track the
object along the specified trajectory Cspec, i.e., ∀i, ||cˆi − cspeci ||2 ≤ ε,s.t. cˆi =
center(CWP (f(z, xˆi))). center(·) gets the prediction center through the predic-
tion box. The Euclidean distance between the prediction center cˆi and the target
center cspeci should be small. Here we set ε to 20 pixels.
(2) Untargeted Attack. The adversarial video Vˆ causes the adversarial tra-
jectory Battack = {CWP (f(z, xˆi))}ni=1 to deviate from the original trajectory
Bgt of an object. When the IOU of the prediction box and the ground-truth
box is zero, i.e., IOU(Battack,Bgt) = 0, we think that the untargeted attack is
successful.
3.2 Drift Loss Attack
Trackers based on the Siamese network are highly dependent on the response
map generated by the fully-convolutional network to predict the object’s loca-
tion. Because the SiamFC uses a search area x when predicting the object’s
location, we can attack this search area to achieve untargeted attack. Over time,
the tracker will accumulate the predicted slight offset until the tracker com-
pletely loses the object.
In Figure 2 a), the darker the color in response map S, the greater the re-
sponse score. The red area and green area represent the response regions of the
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Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed drift loss and embedded feature loss. They are de-
signed for untargeted attack and targeted attack. For details, see sections 3.2 and 3.3.
adversarial image and clean image. c represents the maximum score in the re-
sponse map. For a well-trained tracker, the response map of clean examples are
generally concentrated on the central area (green area). Thus, we propose a drift
loss, which generates adversarial perturbations that drift the activation center
of S:
l(y, s) = log(1 + exp(−ys)), (1)
where s represents the response score and y ∈ (−1, 1) represents the label of
grid in response map S. The central part of the response map S (green area)
is labeled 1, and the rest is -1. In order to generate adversarial examples, the
maximum response value of the non-intermediate response map is greater than
the maximum response value of the ground-truth, so the score loss of the response
map can be written as:
Lscore(G) = min
p∈S+1
(l(y[p], s[p]))− max
p∈S−1
(l(y[p], s[p])), (2)
where p ∈ S represents each position in the response map. The offset of the
prediction box depends on the offset of the activation center in the response map.
We want the activation center to be as far away from the center as possible, so
the distance loss can be expressed as:
Ldist(G) = β1
δ + ‖p+1max − p−1max‖2
− ξ, (3)
where pimax = arg max
p∈Si
(s[p]), i = +1,−1 represents position of max activation
scores in positive areas or negative areas of response map. δ is a small real
number, and β1 controls weight in distance loss. ξ controls the offset degree of
the activation center. Usually, the activation center leaves the central area. The
drift loss consisting of score loss and distance loss can be written as:
Ldrift = Ldist + β2Lscore. (4)
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3.3 Embedded Feature Loss Attack
Since the targeted attack requires the tracker to track along the specified tra-
jectory, it is different from the untargeted attack. The drift loss in Section 3.2 is
easy to achieve the untargeted attack, but its attack direction is random, and it
cannot achieve targeted attack. The input to the targeted attack are a video V
and the specified trajectory’s centers Cspec. Due to the great difference between
the object and background, the response value of the candidate image xR+1 and
the exemplar image z along the specified trajectory will gradually drop to be
lower in the background area. Thus, the targeted attack will soon fail.
For effective targeted attack, we need increase the response value. As shown
in Figure 2 b), we want to minimize the L2 distance between the features of the
adversarial exemplar and the specific trajectory area. Thus, we propose embed-
ded feature loss that generates adversarial images zˆ and xˆR+1. The features of
the generated adversarial examples are close to the features of the embedded
image e.
Lembed(G) = ‖ϕ(q + G(q))− ϕ(e)‖2, (5)
In Eq 5, e represents the specified trajectory area, q ∈ {z, xR+1} represents
input video area. z and xR+1 represent the exemplar frame and the R+ 1 frame
to track. ϕ represents the feature function, and G(q) represents adversarial per-
turbation. After feature extraction, the features of the adversarial image and the
embedded image should be as close as possible to achieve targeted attack.
In the training phase, the choice of embedded images is very important. For
example, the feature distance between a shepherd dog and a sled dog is smaller
than that of a shepherd dog and an Egyptian cat. In the actual attack, we find
that attacking a video frame to an object will produce significant perturbations.
We use Gaussian noise to replace the object feature in e to optimize Eq 5, but
the specified trajectory remains unchanged.
3.4 Unified and Real-time Adversary
As shown in Figure 3, we train a GAN to generate adversarial examples. Neces-
sarily, generating adversarial perturbations can be seen as an image translation
task [24]. We generate adversarial perturbations for candidate images in the can-
didate frames, which are more difficult to perceive in space. We refer to cycle
GAN [36] as a generator to learn the mapping from natural images to adver-
sarial perturbations. We adopt the generator proposed in paper [15] and use
nine blocks to generate adversarial perturbations. For the discriminator, we use
PatchGAN [13], which uses the overlapping image patch to determine whether
the image is true or false.
The loss of the discriminator can be expressed as:
LD(G,D,X ) = Ex∼pdata(x)[(D(G(x) + x))2]
+ Ex∼pdata(x)[(D(x)− 1)2].
(6)
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Fig. 3. The training and inference framework of FAN. In a), we train the generator and
discriminator using the well-trained SiamFC architecture (yellow area + convolution
parameters). The losses of the generator and the discriminator are highlighted by the
purple parts and blue parts, respectively. We can achieve both a targeted attack and an
untargeted attack by adjusting the loss weight of the generator. For untargeted attack
b), we only generate adversarial perturbations for search area x in the candidate image
IC . For targeted attack c), we attack both the exemplar image z and the specific search
area (the blue part in c), which is determined by the specific trajectory.
In the training phase, we train the discriminator by minimizing Eq 6. In
order to make the image generated by the generator more realistic, the loss of
the generator can be expressed as:
LG(G,D,X ) = Ex∼pdata(x)[(D(G(x) + x)− 1)2]. (7)
In addition, we use the L2 distance as a measure to minimize the loss of
similarity so that the adversarial image is closer to the clean image in visual
space. The loss of similarity can be expressed as:
Lsim(G) = E[‖X − Xˆ‖2]. (8)
Finally, the full objective for the generator can be expressed as:
L = LG + α1Lsim + α2Lembed + α3Ldrift, (9)
We propose a unified network architecture, which can achieve a targeted at-
tack and untargeted attack by adjusting the hyperparameters. β1, β2 make Ldist
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and Lscore roughly equal. Thus, there is no need for special adjustment. ξ con-
trols the offset degree of the activation center. α1 and α3 control the untargeted
attack. We fix α3 and adjust α1 from the visual quality. α2 controls embedding
image features. We test value from 0.05-0.1 and the precision score improves ten
percentage. For the targeted attack, we do not need drift loss, so set α3 to 0,
α1 = 0.0024 and α2 = 0.1. For the untargeted attack, we set α2 to 0, α1 = 0.0016,
and α3 = 10. In Eq 3, we set β1 = 1, δ = 1 ∗ 10−10, ξ = 0.7. In Eq 4, β2 is set
to 10. We use Adam algorithm [22] to optimize generator G and discriminator
D alternatively. Using a GPU Titan XP, we can get the best weight by iterating
about 10 epochs(about 3 hours) on the ILSVRC 2015 dataset.
Since the prediction box of the tracker in the current frame is strongly de-
pendent on the results of the previous frame, we can make the prediction box
produce a small error offset and eventually stay away from the ground-truth tra-
jectory. We only add perturbations to the candidate image x for the untargeted
attack. For targeted attack, we embed features of embedding images in exemplar
states z and candidate images x by adding adversarial perturbations. Although
the adversarial attack deals with a large number of videos, the generator can
generate adversarial examples in milliseconds. This enables us to complete the
real-time adversarial attack for visual object tracking.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets and Threat models
We train the generator and discriminator on the training set of the ILSVRC
2015 dataset [26]. We refer to the training strategy in SiamFC [1]. After training
is completed, the generator is tested on four challenging visual object tracking
datasets without parameter adjustment: OTB2013 [31], OTB2015, VOT2014,
and VOT2018 [16]. Specifically, the VOT datasets will be re-initialized after the
tracker fails to track. Therefore, it is more difficult to attack VOT datasets than
OTB datasets. We use SiamFC based on Alexnet as a white-box attack model.
SiamRPN [20], SiamRPN+CIR [35] and SiamRPN++ [19] as black-box attack
models.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Since the targeted attack and untargeted attack are different, we define their
own evaluation criteria, respectively.
Untargeted Attack Evaluation: In the OTB dataset, we use success score,
precision score, and success rate as the evaluation criteria. The success score
calculates the average IOU of the prediction box and the ground-truth. The
precision score indicates the percentages of the video frames whose euclidean
distance between the estimated centers and ground-truth centers is less than the
given threshold. The percentage of successful attacked frames to all the frames
is the success rate.
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In the VOT dataset, we measure the accuracy in the videos using the suc-
cess score. Considering the restart mechanism in the VOT dataset, robustness
is a more important evaluation metric. Mean-Failures refer to calculating the
average number of failures for the object tracking algorithm in all datasets.
Targeted Attack Evaluation: The target attack requires the tracker to move
according to a specific trajectory, so we use the precision score as the eval-
uation criteria. The higher the precision score, the more effective the targeted
attack.
Image Quality Assessment: We use Mean-SSIM to evaluate the quality of
adversarial videos. Mean-SSIM calculates the average SSIM of frames in videos.
The generated adversarial perturbations are difficult to be found when Mean-
SSIM is close to 1.
4.3 Untargeted Attack Results
Datasets Clean Videos Adversarial Videos Drop Rate
OTB2013
Success Score 0.53 0.14 74%
Precision Score 0.71 0.17 76%
Success Rate 0.66 0.12 81%
Mean-SSIM 1 0.93 7%
OTB2015
Success Score 0.53 0.15 72%
Precision Score 0.72 0.18 75%
Success Rate 0.66 0.12 81%
Mean-SSIM 1 0.93 7%
VOT2014
Success Score 0.54 0.42 22%
Mean-Failures 28 112 300%
Mean-SSIM 1 0.94 6%
VOT2018
Success Score 0.49 0.42 14%
Mean-Failures 48 246 413%
Mean-SSIM 1 0.97 3%
Table 1. Untargeted attacks on VOT and OTB datasets. We use drop rate to measure
the attack performance. Large Mean-Failures means the tracker frequently lost objects.
In Table 1, we report the results of the untargeted attack on four tracking
datasets. The second and the third columns represent the object tracking results
of SiamFC on the clean video and the adversarial video. The drop rate of track-
ing evaluation metrics for OTB datasets has fallen by at least 72%, indicating
that our attack method is effective. For the quality assessment, the highest drop
rate is only 7%, which is sufficient to show that adversarial perturbations gen-
erated by our attack method are visually imperceptible.
We find that the success rate is the most vulnerable evaluation metrics on the
OTB dataset, with a drop rate of 81%. This indicates that our attack method can
effectively reduce the IOU between the prediction box and the ground-truth box.
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Fig. 4. We visualize the tracking results under the untargeted attack. Yellow represents
a ground-truth bounding box and, red represents predicted bounding box by trackers.
Our attack method increases the number of tracking failures as high as 413%
on the VOT2018 dataset. Therefore, our attack method can still effectively fool
the tracker and cause it to lose objects under the reinitialization mechanism.
However, compared with the OTB datasets, there is no significant decrease in
the success score on VOT datasets. The reason may be that the success score
is still high because the tracker keeps reinitializing the object. According to the
definition of untargeted attack, Mean-Failures is more reasonable for evaluating
adversarial attacks. Finally, the VOT2018’s Mean-SSIM dropped only 3%. Our
generator sparsely attacks video frames over time, resulting in that perturba-
tions less difficult to be perceived.
We show an adversarial video in Figure 4, which is sampled equidistantly in
time from left to right. We added slight perturbations in search images to suc-
cessfully fool the SiamFC tracker. This kind of attack method does not produce
too much deviation in a short-time and is difficult to be detected by trackers.
The third line represents adversarial perturbations, and FAN can adaptively at-
tack the critical feature areas without prior shapes.
The left-to-right in Figure 5 are the results of the uniform sampling of a video
over time. By comparing the second row and the fourth row, we can see that the
responding area of the clean image is concentrated, and the scores are not much
different (the green part). However, the adversarial examples generated by FAN
start to cause a large range of high scores in the response map and are relatively
scattered. These scattered high-scoring areas will fool the SiamFC tracker to
make it impossible to distinguish the object. Due to incorrect activation of the
response map, the search areas in adversarial examples will gradually shrink over
time. The subsequent adversarial perturbations will also increase the degree of
narrowing of the search areas (the extent of the fourth line is reduced differently
in equal time). The perturbations gradually decrease in space over time due to
the FAN attack on the search areas.
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Fig. 5. The visualization of response maps between adversarial examples and clean
videos, respectively. Blue indicates low response, and red indicates high response.
4.4 Comparisons with the Baselines
To better show the performance, we compare our FAN method with the widely
used FGSM [11] and PGD [21]. The results are shown in Table 2.
Methods Success Score Precision Score Success Rate Mean-SSIM Time(s)
FGSM 3% 2% 3% 0.95 0.03
PGD 3% 2% 3% 0.97 3.53
FAN 74% 76% 81% 0.94 0.01
Table 2. The untargeted attacks on OTB2013. Compared with the FAN method, the
modified FGSM and PGD methods cannot achieve effective attacks. The percentage
represents the drop rate compared to clean video.
Because FGSM and PGD are used to attack the image classification task,
and cannot directly attack the visual object tracking task. Therefore we make
some modifications. In object tracking, tracker searches the most similar regions
in each frame with the reference patch. The most similar regions in the response
map are labeled 1; the others in the response map are -1. Therefore, for FGSM
and PGD, the attack target is to change the correct label in the response map
(invert label 1 to -1). We perform experiments on the modified FGSM and PGD
methods at OTB2013 and compared them with the FAN method.
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The percentages in Table 2 represent the drop rate versus different metrics.
We can see that these two methods are not effective for attacking VOT tasks. Be-
sides, the average time for PGD to process a sample is 3.5s, which is not suitable
for attacking a large number of frames. Under the same hardware conditions,
our method process a sample only need 0.01s, and it can effectively attack clean
videos.
4.5 Targeted Attack Results
We need to set specific trajectories for the video frames in the dataset to achieve
targeted attack. Since the VOT datasets will be reinitialized when the tracker
is far away from the ground-truth, there is no point in implementing a targeted
attack on the VOT datasets. Our targeted attack method still works because it
can cause the tracker to restart multiple times on the VOT dataset. For clean
videos in the VOT2014, SiamFC will restart tracking per 108.8 frames. After at-
tacked by our method, SiamFC will restart tracking per 14 frames, which shows
our method significantly increases numbers of restart for tracker in the VOT
dataset in the targeted attacks.
Datasets Clean Videos Adversarial Videos Drop Rate
OTB2013
Precision Score 0.69 0.41 40.6%
Mean-SSIM 1 0.92 8%
OTB2015
Precision Score 0.71 0.42 40.8%
Mean-SSIM 1 0.92 8%
Table 3. An overview of the targeted attack results. We use precision scores to evaluate
targeted attacks. A high precision score means that the tracker’s prediction is close to
the specified trajectory.
We conduct experiments on OTB2013 and OTB2015 datasets. Manually la-
beling specific trajectories on these datasets will be time-consuming. Therefore,
we generate specific trajectories based on the original annotations. Here we con-
sider the most difficult case of a targeted attack. That is, the generated specific
trajectory is completely opposite to the original trajectory. We use the following
rules to calculate the bounding box for specific trajectory:
bspect =
{
bgt0 t = 1
2 ∗ bgtt−1 − bgtt t ≥ 2,
(10)
where bspec represents the bounding box of specified trajectory, and bgt repre-
sents ground-truth in datasets.
In Table 3, the first and second columns represent precision scores of tracker’s
predicted trajectory on clean videos and adversarial videos. Experiment results
show that the tracking system after the targeted attack cannot reach the same
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Fig. 6. The results under targeted attacks. Green represents a ground-truth bound-
ing box, cyan represents the specific bounding box, and red represents the predicted
bounding box by trackers. The cyan and red boxes are basically the same in time series,
which indicates that targeted attack is successful.
precision scores on the clean video. The reason for this result may be that the
automatically generated specific trajectory is not the best path that the targeted
attack can choose. Even if the targeted attack of visual tracking is more difficult
than an untargeted attack, FAN can still successfully attack most videos under
the most difficult specific trajectories.
We visualize the results of the targeted attack in Figure 6. The first and
third lines represent bounding boxes on the clean video and the adversarial
video. The second line represents the specific trajectories we automatically gen-
erated according to Eq 10. It can be seen that the predicted bounding box by
tracker is basically the same as the specific bounding box. The fourth line shows
adversarial perturbations from the search region, which is significantly stronger
than adversarial perturbations in the untargeted attack. Therefore, the targeted
attack is more difficult than the untargeted attack under limited disturbance.
4.6 Transferability to SiamRPN
We use SiamRPN [20], SiamRPN+CIR [35], SiamRPN++ [19] as black-box
attack models to verify the transferability of adversarial examples generated
by FAN. SiamRPN uses an RPN network to perform location regression and
classification on the response map. SiamRPN+CIR uses the ResNeXt22 network
to replace SiamRPN’s Alexnet. SiamRPN++ performs layer-wise and depth-wise
aggregations to improve accuracy.
The experimental results are shown in Table 4. The first column refers to the
drop rate of a white-box attack method. The other columns refer to the drop
rate of black-box attack methods. We find that black-box attack methods have a
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Methods SiamFC SiamRPN SiamRPN+CIR SiamRPN++
OTB2013
Success Score 74% 55% 46% 33%
Precision Score 76% 47% 58% 35%
Success Rate 81% 56% 47% 35%
OTB2015
Success Score 72% 44% 45% 32%
Precision Score 75% 51% 58% 37%
Success Rate 81% 55% 43% 39%
Table 4. Transferability of adversarial examples on two datasets.
lower drop rate than the white-box attack method. It is obvious that black-box
attack methods are more difficult than a white-box attack method. Except for the
precision score, the performance of the black-box attack in SiamRPN is better
than SiamRPN+CIR. This may be due to SiamRPN and SiamFC using the
same feature extraction network AlexNet. The black-box attack in SiamRPN++
performs the worst. This is because the architecture of SiamRPN++ can correct
some spatial offsets. Even in this case, the drop rate of the black-box attacks
can still reach 32%. The results show that our method can still show good
transferability for different tracking methods.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we accomplished the adversarial attacks for the Visual Object
Tracking (VOT) task. We analyzed the weaknesses of DNNs based VOT models:
the feature networks and the loss function, and then designed different attacking
strategies. We firstly presented a drift loss to make the high-score area obtained
by adversarial examples be offset with the original area. Then a pre-defined
trajectory was embedded into the feature space of the original images to perform
the targeted attack. Finally, we proposed an end-to-end framework to integrate
these two modules. Experiments conducted on two public datasets verified the
effectiveness of the proposed method. In addition, our method not only achieved
excellent performance on the white-box attack, but also on the black-box attack,
which expanded its application area. Furthermore, the image quality assessment
showed that the generated adversarial examples had good imperceptibility, which
guaranteed the security of the adversarial examples.
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